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Abstract 
Pluralism in economics appears to be a double-edged sword: we need more 
than one theory to grasp and explain the entire economic world, yet a plurality 
of possible explanations undermines the aspiration of the economic discipline 
to provide ‘objective knowledge’ in the singular of the ‘one world one truth’ 
conception. Therefore, pluralism is often equated with relativism and 
obscurantism. In this article, I will explore both the demand for pluralism and 
the fear of relativism and obscurantism, scrutinising each position in order to 
evaluate their respective justification and devising a methodological proposal 
that may appease both the defender and the sceptic of economic pluralism 
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1. Introduction 
The economic discipline is concerned with decision-making in circumstances in 
which alternative uses of goods and factors of production need to be considered 
along with the general outcome of such individual decisions in terms of income 
generation and distribution and its degree of stability over time contributing to 
an increasingly complex world. Economic interaction is – like social interaction 
in general and, thus, unlike natural laws – not god-given, but man-made and 
dependent on cultural, institutional and random factors which may be different 
at different points in time and even in different regions of the world at the same 
time. Can we, then, expect to explain economic activity with just one set of ideas 
using only one general approach based on a single world view?  
That is certainly what economists tend to believe, as they aspire to produce 
objective knowledge and hold on to the ‘one world one truth’ conception of 
reality. It is, of course, the blueprint of the natural sciences that economics is 
following1 in its belief that the economic system is governed by a unifying 
principle: rationality in the use of its resources and rationality in its actions. Since 
the dawning of the Age of Enlightenment, man came to understand that he has 
been endowed with reason in order to shape his fate beyond age-old, (mainly) 
religiously motivated traditions and conventions and, moreover, that reason will 
enable him to discover ‘what makes the world go round’: “from the outset, what 
is unique to enlightenment is its immanent relation to a criterion of rational 
validity which acts as a standard against which opinions and convictions can be 
upheld by rational examination” (Honneth 1987: 693).   
Accepting the restrictive motivational basis of economic action2 – enscapsulated 
in the figure of homo oeconomicus – will result in a unique approach to economics 
only if the ensuing ontological presumption (or, as Joseph Schumpeter puts it, 
the pre-analytical vision) was itself pre-determined by the nature of the system 
under investigation. Or to put it more bluntly: if the economic system was to be 
assumed a ‘closed system’ in which all elements are interconnected in a unique 
and known way (and which can be seen as an apriori analytical proposition) and 
behave entirely rationally, the paradigm of intertemporal exchange based on 
specialisation, market coordination and optimisation would be the one and only 
representation. This is not to say that all different aspects of economic inquiry – 
from labour markets to international trade , from economic growth to financial 
markets – would be treated by a single theoretical approach or, even less so, that 
different perspectives – static versus dynamic, equilibrium versus 
disequilibrium, equalibrating versus adaptive, to name just a few – or different 
methods of inquiry – formal or narrative, econometric or qualitative – would 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Mirowski (1989), who shows that “(t)he development of physics […] served as 
a template for the development of economics as a science” (Brahmachari 2016). 
2 Which, of course, dissenting schools of thought such as behavioural economics or 
complexity economics refuse to do. 
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have to be compressed into a single methodical framework. But its significance 
would be that all different schools and approaches – which may superficially 
look quite different and even opposed to each other3 – were commensurate and 
share some common postulates: Say’s law of markets or its modern version, 
Walras’s law, and the classical dichotomy including the (long-term) neutrality of 
money. Within this paradigmatic shell, a variety of different universes of 
discourse (international economics, financial economics, labour economics, etc.), 
different theoretical approaches which may eventually stabilise as ‘schools of 
thought’ (neoclassical economics, behavioural economics, Keynesian economics, 
etc.) and different perspectives (allocational, evolutionary, institutional, etc.) will 
evolve and happily co-exist.4   
Taking this position – and I would go so far as to claim this is the position of most 
economists – it becomes clear why the call of ever more students to pluralise the 
economic discipline has not been received with much enthusiasm and support 
by the economic epistemic community in general. On the one hand, it has been 
claimed for the reasons described above that economics is already pluralistic with 
respect to theories, methods and perspectives (see e.g. Becker 2017; 
Cedrini/Fontana 2017)5. On the other hand, methodological and ontological 
pluralism has been rejected as a backward step in the development and 
professionalisation of the discipline only giving rise to relativism and 
obscurantism (see e.g. Backhouse 1998; Tirole 2014).  
In the following, I will take up both the demand for pluralism and the fear of 
relativism and obscurantism and scrutinise each position in order to evaluate 
their respective justification and devise a methodological proposal that may 
appease both the defender and the sceptic of economic pluralism. 
2. Pluralism, what pluralism? 
Before we consider the state of economics as a scientific discipline, let us first do 
some philosophical groundwork: the set of theories and models which form the 
backbone of scientific inquiry are often called ‘paradigms’ (Thomas Kuhn), 
‘scientific research programmes’ (SRPs; Imre Lakatos) or ‘thought styles’ 
                                                          
3 For instance, the relationship between ‘classical’ political economics and ‘neo-classical 
economics’ is often seen as conflictual or non- or contra-classical rather than as 
continuous, as the term ‘neo’ seems to suggest; see e.g. Dobb 1973: 248; Schumpeter 1954: 
919; Zafirovski 1999: 46).  
4 Such a friendly coexistence does not rule out the possibility of one particular school of 
thought using particular methods and perspectives becoming dominant at a given point 
in time, nor of this changing over time. 
5 Occasionally it is argued that “the full panoply of perspectives” may be disguised in 
introductory courses “where the professor is keen to demonstrate how markets work” 
(Rodrik 2015: 198). Thus charging economics with a lack of pluralism is portrayed either 
as a matter of informational distortion (on the part of students) or bad communication 
(on the part of teachers). 
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(Ludwik Fleck). What is more important than the label is the content: paradigms, 
scientific research programmes or thought styles comprise three dimensions:  
1) the ontological dimension is concerned with the essence of the object of 
inquiry, its basic constituents. Once the object of inquiry – in our case: the 
economic system – is taken as a closed system, in principle it is fully 
analysable (despite its potential complexity6) and its essence is given. In 
contrast, open systems in which some elements or their relations are 
unknown become complex to a higher degree (depending on the number of 
unknowns), indeterminate and in essence open to specification. In order to 
close the system, such unknowns must be axiomatically assumed (dubbed 
‘core axioms’ in Lakatosian SRPs). These assumptions, again, are apriori 
purely synthetical, can be contested, and shape the essence of our object of 
inquiry. As mentioned above, open systems allow for different ontological 
specifications or, as they are sometimes called, different pre-analytic 
visions.  
2) The epistemological dimension breaks down the pre-analytical vision 
situated in the ontological dimension into core and auxiliary assumptions 
or, in Lakatosian terms, determines the ‘negative heuristic’ which “specifies 
certain claims of the research programme as not revisable” (Brahmachari 
2016: 5) and the ‘positive heuristic’ forming a protective belt around the core 
axioms. This can be tinkered with if, for instance, empirical evidence or the 
pursuit of a particular perspective indicate the necessity to do so.  
3) The methodological dimension can be seen as ‘meta-methodical’, as it 
specifies the procedures accepted by the epistemic community to 
discriminate between ‘truth’ and ‘non-truth’ or ‘science’ and ’non-science’. 
It is part of the professionalisation of a scientific discipline to agree on a 
common methodological foundation.   
The dispute about pluralism in economics can only be understood against the 
backcloth of conceptual confusion. This confusion stems from a lack of precision 
in notions and a proper distinction between pluralism and mere variety. As 
shown in Heise (2017), pluralism not only entails a multitude of particular 
occurrences, but includes an oppositional stance including incommensurability 
of elements. Therefore, simply pointing to a multitude of theories and models 
does not necessarily prove the existence of pluralism in economics if these 
various theories either only complement each other with respect to their topical 
focus or are commensurable with respect to their ontological foundation but take 
                                                          
6 Everything has a certain complexity. In this respect, referring to something as being 
‘complex’ is virtually meaningless. In ordinary parlance, ‘complexity’ generally means 
‘complicatedness’ in terms of numbers of elements and relations between them. Yet, if 
all the elements and their relations are known – i.e. if we consider a ‘closed system’ – 
then the complexity that is low for the system is (pre-)determined even if the number of 
elements and relations is high.  
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different epistemological or methodical perspectives. In that case, instead of 
acknowledging pluralism we would rather have to speak of a variety of theories 
or models in the epistemological dimension – whose existence and basic necessity 
can hardly be denied.            
On the other hand, pluralism thus not only entails some incommensurability but 
also points to the ontological dimension of a paradigm, since in the interests of 
quality control and standardisation the methodological dimension necessarily 
assumes monism.7 And here, denying pluralism implies the acceptance of the 
economic system as being closed or, to put it differently, as having a unique 
ontological specification or pre-analytic vision. Conversely, pluralism in a 
meaningful sense (i.e. beyond mere intraparadigmatic variation) is based on the 
confirmation of the economic system as an open system and therefore the 
acknowledgement of ontological pluralism as the conditio sine qua non of 
paradigmatic pluralism. 
Is there any plausible reason to believe that the economic system is closed? It is 
surely plausible to close the system by some ontological assumptions, otherwise 
it would be impossible to analyse it and make any meaningful predictions. 
However, the necessity of some closures does not imply a peculiar closure from 
the outset. Therefore, paradigmatic pluralism based on alternative (mutually 
exclusive) ontological foundations8 is much more likely to be the state of a 
healthy, progressive economic discipline than paradigmatic monism merely 
allowing for intraparadigmatic variation often misleadingly dubbed pluralism. 
Moreover, due to the famous Duhem-Quine thesis (see e.g. Cross 1982; 
Sawyer/Beed/Sankey 1997) stating “it is not possible to falsify single hypotheses 
because it is invariably conjunctions of hypotheses which are being tested” (Cross 
1982: 320), and disclosing the manifest methodological restrictions of non-
experimental science, paradigms can never be invariably refuted. Therefore, 
paradigmatic pluralism is not merely an ethical norm (‘tolerance’ or ‘fairness’) 
but a scientific imperative: only if paradigmatic pluralism is approved and 
practised within the epistemic community can the accusation of ideological 
distortion often lodged against the economic discipline be rejected (see Heise 
2019) and academic freedom acknowledged.9 
                                                          
7 Methodological monism denies neither a variety of methods and perspectives nor the 
potential targeting of different methodologies – however, accepting methodological 
pluralism would force an interdisciplinary scope beyond the disciplinary borders to 
economics. 
8 As far as I can see, there are three different pre-analytical visions in economic 
theorizing: mainstream or standard economics is based, as already mentioned above, on 
intertemporal exchange, post-Keynesianism on nominal obligations (creditor-debtor-
relationships) and Marxism on power relations as basic constituents. 
9 An investigatory committee of the Canadian Association of University Teachers 
(CAUT), for instance, ruled that the reduction or elimination of approaches and views 
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3. Pluralism versus relativism 
“In the past, many approaches have been considered to be economics: do 
physiocracy, the Scholastic School of Salamanca or the racial economics of the 
Nazis need academic representation? Most of the heterodoxies rather appear to 
have been unfruitful scientific cul-de-sacs. At any rate, the burden of proof of 
being would otherwise lie with the proponents of the heterodox approaches” 
(Bachmann 2016: 598; my translation). Although this remark may not be taken as 
an appropriate contention with the issue of pluralism, it still contains the 
reservations most economists have about a pluralisation of the economic 
discipline:10  
1) pluralisation implies an unconditional ‘anything goes’ opening the doors 
to obscuratism or even solipsism;  
2) contending approaches (‘heterodoxies’) have not been successful in the 
past;  
3) mainstream economics is the buck against which heterodox contenders 
have to actively prove their right to exist. 
In all these reservations, one critical consideration shines through: how can a 
science aspiring to produce objective knowledge accept a state of plurality as 
desirable if plurality implies incommensurabilities and even an oppositional 
stance? Would that not necessarily imply a relativism that runs counter the 
discipline’s own self-acclaim and self-conception? Sheila Dow (2004: 282) is 
surely right when she states, “Were it defensible, a monist approach would be 
more satisfactory”. Yet such an approach is simply indefensible given the 
methodological restrictions outlined above. All that economics can ever claim to 
produce is ‘conjectural knowledge’ that needs to be tested empirically and must 
be accepted as long as it has not been clearly falsified. And, of course, the number 
of proponents and users of a paradigm is only a measure of its ‘fruitfulness’ once 
the ’battleground of economic ideas’ is even (or, to use a more appropriate 
metaphor, if the ‘market for economic ideas’ is perfect) – and there is much 
evidence that this is not the case (see Heise 2016; Heise/Thieme 2017; 
Fourcade/Ollion/Algan 2015). No paradigm can claim priority over others per 
se.  
However, the potential co-existence of competing conjectural knowledge based 
on incommensurable paradigms is not to be misunderstood as relativism but 
simply reminds us of the possibility of deception. And to equate pluralism with 
                                                          
outside mainstream economics at the Economics Department of the University of 
Manitoba must be seen as a serious violation of academic freedom. 
10 Usually, they are introduced and supplemented with the pretention that “it is never 
accurately substantiated why paradigmatic plurality in economics is necessary or, at 
least, desirable” (Bachmann 2016: 598) – I hope to have shown above that this claim is 
clearly wrong.  
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obscurantism is, however, another non-sequitur fallacy: acknowledging the 
imperative of paradigmatic pluralism does not deny the acceptance of quality 
standards and, indeed, methodological monism has been approved precisely in 
order to distinguish accepted from non-accepted (conjectural) knowledge.11 If we 
grant the Salamanca School of economics, physiocracy or the racial economics of 
the Nazis (probably chosen for their apparent obscurity) the status of economic 
paradigms,12 it is self-evident that they do not fulfil the methodological 
requirements of logical rigor and empirical non-falsification necessary for 
substantiated academic representation. However, paradigms such as post-
Keynesianism, Marxism, neo-Riciardianism or complexity economics, for 
instance, which all share the fate of near-extinction in academic economics, do 
have legitimate claims to representation (see e.g. Lee/Lavoie 2014; 
Heise/Thieme 2016).     
4. Comparing scientific research programmes and the choice of 
paradigms 
Economics is caught somewhere between highest scientific aspirations and 
methodological restrictions. It wants to be a science as ‘hard’ as a social science 
can possibly be,13 yet not dogmatic or ideological. This balancing act is practised 
rather unsuccessfully: instead of advocating and defending its methodological 
standards while fostering paradigmatic pluralism to bolster against any 
ideological bias and restriction of academic freedom, methodological diversity 
and epistemological variation is mistakenly adduced to counter the lack of 
paradigmatic plurality while still defending an orthodox ‘citadel’ (see e.g 
MacKenzie 2017). But even this practice, although inappropriately restricting the 
number of available paradigms to conduct research, does not prevent the users 
of economics – researchers as ‘producers’, politicians and laymen as ‘consumers’ 
                                                          
11 Jon Elster (2007: 445) highlights the importance of methodological monism as a 
criterion for judging whether a discipline has become a science or not. 
12 Which can reasonably be disputed. 
13 Elster (2007: 445ff.) measures the ’hardness’ of a science by a) its methodological 
monism, b) the irreversibility of its scientific progress, c) its ability to summarise 
commonly shared basics in textbooks and d) its old masters being only of historical 
interest. Seemingly, he believes economics not to be a truly hard science yet, because 
although he acknowledges economics fulfils c) and d), fulfilment of a) and b) is still 
lacking. Particularly the fact that economics is still debating many basic economic 
phenomena such as the explanation for unemployment – due to a variety (not 
necessarily plurality!) of theories – is taken as proof of the discipline’s ‘softness’ 
 as a science. Taking the ability to produce a single, commonly shared and accepted 
‘knowledge’ (‘one world one truth’) as an indicator of a ’hard science’, Elster’s 
reservations against economics may be traceable – yet, this judgement does not conform 
to his own definition. As we have seen, methodological monism does not necessarily 
come with epistemological and ontological or, more generally, paradigmatic monism. 
Therefore, accepting Elster’s imputations, equating paradigmatic variation or even 
pluralism with the softness of a science may be intuitive but is simply incorrect. 
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and students as prospective producers alike – from having to choose which 
model or theory to select. If for example we want to explain the impact of 
minimum wages on employment, we always have the choice between different 
models or theories (see fig. 1): within standard economics, we can choose 
between competitive labour market models and labour market models based on 
imperfect competition, between labour market models with or without frictions 
(all models showing different auxiliary assumptions) – however, they all model 
the labour market on the idea of intertemporal exchange (core assumptions). But 
there could also be the choice between models based on intertemporal exchange 
(standard economics) and those based on nominal obligations (post-Keynesian 
economics) or power relations (Marxian economics) – in all cases, the impact of 
minimum wages on employment may be very different (see e.g. Heise 2019; 
Heise 2020). 
Figure 1: Navigating among models (examples in brackets) 
         
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having to choose between different approaches implies knowing and comparing 
them in order to select the appropriate one. The comparative methodology has 
been used in economics quite comprehensively to better understand the impact 
of institutions or policy regimes on economic outcomes such as productivity, 
growth, employment or inflation (see e.g. the literature on ‘varieties of 
capitalism’, the ‘market constellation approach’ and ‘comparative economics’; 
Hall/Soskice 2001; Heise 2011; Djankov et al. 2003); it is almost unknown as a 
tool for discriminating between theories, models or paradigms. It is one thing to 
speculate on the reasons for this omission, but another to notice its consequences: 
the omission may be due to a sheer lack of demand. If researchers do not feel they 
have to make an informed choice – which would be the case if they were unaware 
of alternatives or simply selected theories because of their alleged novelty – there 
would be no need for comparison to provide information about differences or 
Paradigm A 
(Post-Keynesianism) 
Paradigm B 
(Standard Economics) 
Theory A 
(Z-D model) 
Theory B 
(monopsony model) 
Theory C 
(competitive model) 
Theory D 
(frictional model) 
Phenomenon A 
(unemployment) 
Reality 
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communalities. The consequence of the omission, however, is clear: the choice 
every user (consumer or producer) of the economic discipline has to face will be 
undertaken uninformed, intuitively or based on particular incentives (e.g. 
external monetary incentives or the quest to produce novelties).  
Comparativism has hardly penetrated the philosophy of science (see e.g. Pearce 
1991; Burger/Heidema 1994), and I am not aware of any comparative approach 
in economics. Occasionally at best, different theories are juxtaposed (as in 
Walsh/Gram 1980; Crotty 2011; Munoz 2011; Wolff/Resnick 2012, which has 
been termed ‘descriptive comparison’; see Giesen/Schmid 1978: 180 f.)14 or 
viewed from a history of thought perspective but not compared analytically 
(termed ‘methodological comparison’; see Giesen/Schmid 1978: 180 f.) so as to 
provide a basis for choice. The situation is quite different in sociology, which has 
always been characterised (some would say: plagued) by a great variety of 
approaches (see e.g. Ritzer 1975). As early as the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
discipline in Germany and elsewhere discussed the possibilities and limitations 
of a systematic comparison of theories as a “particularly effective critique of the 
involved approaches which could contribute to the discovery of superior and, 
consequently, the segregation of suboptimal theories or subtheories” (Klinkmann 
1981: 249; my translation). It seems fair to state that the endeavour to establish 
‘comparative sociology’ as an institutionalised branch of research was 
unsuccessful (see e.g. Greshoff/Lindemann/Schimank 2007: 6 f.). Although the 
situation in economics is different from that in sociology,15 economics may be 
learning from the failures in sociology – we will come back to this later.  
Before focussing on the concept of comparing paradigms, we should differentiate 
more clearly between notions not always accurately defined: models, theories 
and paradigms. A paradigm is the overarching collection of theories and ‘model 
solutions’ sharing a common negative heuristic (ontology or pre-analytic vision) 
and methodology culminating in very few generally accepted postulates, yet 
differing in methodical approach, subject-matter and positive heuristic. Theories 
are epistemological systems of deductive logic focussing on a particular section 
                                                          
14 Only recently, the German quarterly journal List Forum für Wirtschafts- und 
Finanzpolitik published a special issue entitled Mainstream versus Heterodox Economics: 
Research Programmes in Comparison (see Erlei/Haucap 2019), which assembled a great 
number of different economic approaches without the slightest attempt to do what the 
title promised: to compare the different schools.  
15 While in economics a single paradigm has evolved into an orthodoxy which 
marginalises all other paradigms as heterodox and, thus, comparativism would be an 
attempt to reconcile (more) pluralism with less fear of obscurantism, in sociology no 
approach has yet become dominant in that sense that a Kuhnian state of ‘normal science’ 
has been reached. Here, comparativism would rather be an attempt to search for 
common grounds and, in this respect, to restrict the full panoply of ideas “in order to 
decisively improve the conditions for producing cumulative knowledge in sociology to 
a greater extent than has hitherto been the case” (Greshoff/Lindemann/Schimank 2007: 
9; my translation).    
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of reality and thus providing the analytical structure of the paradigm. And 
models are sets of reductionist, quantifiable relations by which quantitative 
predictions of economic outcomes can be produced. In terms of empirical testing, 
models can clearly be falsified while theories and in particular paradigms entail 
enough leeway (auxiliary assumptions) to provide, at least ex post, predictions 
which cannot easily be rejected by empirical evidence.   
Against this backdrop, comparativism in economics must be discussed in relation 
to its potential achievements. We need to compare in order to make an informed 
choice. If this choice is made on purely scientific grounds,16 verisimilitude would 
be the best candidate as its objective: we should take the approach which explains 
reality best – i.e. according to its explanatory power. Yet this comes with serious 
problems. And this does not simply mean that the empirical test of theoretical 
concepts is always disputable;17 it rather reintroduces the Duhem–Quine critique: 
models may be compared in terms of their verisimilitude and, consequently, 
discriminated by this measure: if, for example, a model based on traditional 
labour market theory including frictions predicts the experienced (i.e. empirically 
measured) employment effects of introducing a minimum wage more 
appropriately than a model based on traditional labour market theory without 
frictions, the former should displace the latter. And if both models were to 
produce quantitative and qualitative (positive versus negative employment 
effects) predictions which conflict with empirical evidence, both models should 
be rejected (see e.g. Heise 2020). Yet the falsification of a model neither 
necessarily falsifies the underlying theory (here the standard neoclassical labour 
market theory) nor the foundational paradigm (here the intertemporal exchange 
paradigm of the neoclassical school): quantitative (e.g. quantitative changes in 
some of the parameters involved) and qualitative (e.g. introducing imperfect 
competition) adjustments to auxiliary assumptions can (and will) be used to 
reconcile ex post theoretical prediction with empirical evidence. Hence 
verisimilitude is a necessary but not sufficient measure in comparison. 
However, ‘repair work’ performed on theories and models to avoid empirical 
falsification must not produce what Ludwik Fleck called a ‘harmony of 
deception’ locking in their followers and proponents in a ‘thought compulsion’ 
which immunises a paradigm against any critical review. Comparing theories 
and paradigms may, therefore, be aimed not so much at their respective 
                                                          
16 If this is an economic choice, the decision will depend on the preferences of the 
scientist. It may be very different depending on the preference ordering of objectives 
such as ‘finding truth’, ‘maximising income’ or ‘maximising reputation’. 
17 Klinkmann (1981: 251 ff.) takes a more critical position not shared here: he argues that 
paradigms cannot be compared effectively because ‘comparing’ implies ‘knowing’ and 
the comparativist can know only the paradigm he is ‘using’ (which means: being part of 
the epistemic community, sharing the pre-analytic vision, being involved in common 
interactions), not the one he compares it with. This position is not shared because of the 
inherent subjectivist assumption of science.  
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verisimilitude as at the “laborious efforts (…) made to explain an exception in 
terms that do not contradict the system” (Fleck 1979: 27). Comparing theories and 
paradigms may contribute to their evaluation and, finally, an informed choice 
with respect to three dimensions: 
1) the amount and direction of adaptations of basic theories can inform us 
about the state of the paradigms or scientific research programmes in a 
Lakatosian sense: are they in a progressive or degenerating state?18 
2) using the concept of Occam’s razor, the degree of simplicity and 
parsimony of theories comprising a paradigm may provide information 
about the required complicatedness (or, as in common parlance: 
complexity) needed to explain a certain phenomenon.  
3) if the choice between theories and paradigms cannot be based on their 
explanatory power (i.e. their output), the accurateness or approximation to 
reality of their (basic and auxiliary) assumptions (i.e. their inputs) can be 
taken as a selection criterion. 
Let us again take the example of a minimum wage introduction and its impact 
on employment. Within the standard economic paradigm of intertemporal 
exchange and its allocational perspective, setting a minimum wage above the 
market clearing level – and this is the only sensible setting, as a minimum wage 
below the market clearing level would be useless – will have to have negative 
employment effects. These effects may be smaller if we assume a labour market 
with imperfections (transaction cost and imperfect competition) rather than a 
‘perfect’ labour market, yet the allocational distortion is unavoidable (see Braun 
et al. 2019). Choosing, alternatively, a post-Keynesian paradigm based on 
nominal obligations and taking a macroeconomic perspective to determine the 
employment effect of minimum wages, the prediction based on a simple Z-D 
theory without any particular assumptions about ‘employment market’19 
frictions would be quite different: there is a high likelihood of minimum wages 
having not employment but rather price effects (see Heise/Pusch 2018). When it 
comes to empirical testing – and the real-world experiment of introducing a 
binding statutory minimum wage in Germany in 2015 fully replicates these 
findings – a vast number of studies using a variety of methods suggest no 
discernible employment effect (see e.g. Schmitt 2013). According to the 
verisimilitude criterion, surely the post-Keynesian employment theory should be 
                                                          
18 According to Imre Lakatos, a scientific research programme (SRP) can be considered 
‘progressive’ when a new theory within that domain of inquiry predicts more than its 
predecessor theory (‘theoretically progressive’) and these predictions are confirmed by 
actual observations (‘empirically progressive’). If an SRP fails to display these 
characteristics, it has become ‘degenerating’. 
19 We use the unfamiliar term ‘employment market’ instead of ‘labour market’ in a post-
Keynesian context in order to avoid the idea of real-wage-driven employment 
determination as in the standard economics paradigm. 
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selected over any model based on standard labour market theory. Moreover, 
with respect to the approximation to reality of the parametric assumptions 
necessary to produce results in line with the empirical evidence, again the post-
Keynesian model fares better than the standard labour market models of any 
variety (see Heise 2018a; Heise 2020: 2 f.). Also, the post-Keynesian employment 
theory suggests, besides the (undiscernible) employment impact, further 
macroeconomic (increase in prices) and structural effects (employment shifts at 
branch level causing a structural change) which can be empirically tested and, 
thus, allow us to rate post-Keynesian theory as progressive in Lakatosian terms. 
The many extensions and supplementations of standard labour market theory 
appear, in contrast, rather to be ‘laborious efforts’ to somehow reconcile 
theoretical prediction with troublesome reality, putting it not only in a state of 
degeneration but also padding out the simple labour market theory in a way that 
any test based on Occam’s razor criterion of simplicity and parsimony would 
surely give way to the post-Keynesian approach.            
5. Discussion 
Comparing models, theories and paradigms may provide information allowing 
the scholar to make a better (i.e. more informed) choice of model based on a 
theoretical foundation embedded in a paradigmatic framework in order to 
address a problem at hand. However, even if all criteria – verisimilitude, state of 
evolution, Occam’s razor and the realisticness of assumptions – privilege one 
theory over the other(s) as in the case above, this does not inexorably imply the 
superiority of the respective paradigm, since, again, the Duhem–Quine critique 
applies: only certain sections of the real world can be placed under scrutiny in 
the above fashion but never entire paradigms (or world views or pre-analytic 
visions). Nevertheless, the state of models and theories with respect to their 
verisimilitude, progressiveness and realisticness may well rub off on the 
attractiveness of a whole paradigm: if the neoclassical labour market theory has 
proven inferior to post-Keynesian determination of employment in a core section 
of its theoretical deduction – the price-quantity link – why should we still favour 
standard economics over post-Keynesian theory in their application to other 
phenomena? Or, more bluntly: why should we not expect a broad shift in the 
economic discipline from the neoclassical intertemporal exchange paradigm to a 
post-Keynesian paradigm of nominal obligations to explain financial crisis, 
determine fiscal policy orientations or model the implications of zero-growth 
economies?  
The answer is twofold: on the one hand, such a paradigm shift or scientific 
revolution in a Kuhnian sense may not be feasible because the ‘market for 
economic ideas’ is imperfect and there are formal and informal incentives (such 
as ‘measuring’ scientific quality by way of impact factors and rankings) which 
interfere with the choice to be made. Part of the imperfection is simply the lack 
of information about alternative paradigms on the part of most standard 
Heise: The need for a comparative approach to scientific research programmes 
12 
 
economists.20 On the other hand, the superiority of the post-Keynesian paradigm 
with respect to the criteria offered may not be as obvious as I have pretended in 
the example above: the limitations of the versimilitude criterion have already 
been mentioned; moreover ever since Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method (1975), 
the aptitude to discriminate theories along the fault line of progressiveness 
versus degeneration in an unamibigious way has been questioned.21 Introducing 
frictions in the neoclassical labour market theory, for instance, may not only be 
considered ‘repair work’ in the face of new and troublesome evidence somewhat 
undermining the theory, but may also provide new insights and testable 
hypotheses (e.g. about search and hire activities in the labour market) which may 
be considered a progressive problem shift increasing the predictive power of the 
paradigm. Also, the criterion of Occam’s razor may not be made accountable as 
easily as it seems at first glance: let us assume an economic outcome EMP is 
determined via two different channels (a and b) which impact on EMP in a 
conclusive way. Yet the same impact could be modelled via four different 
channels (c, d, e and f), two of which (e and f) have the same quantitative impact 
only with opposite signs (i.e. channel e increases EMP while channel f decreases 
EMP to exactly the same degree). Moreover, we have two models (A and B) with 
the same paradigmatic background and one model with a different paradigmatic 
basis (C). The two models of the same paradigmatic background determine EMP 
basically in the same way, yet one model (A) is simpler or more parsimonious in 
the sense that it only relies on two channels of impact (c and d) while the other 
model (B) describes all four channels (c, d, e and f). The third model with a 
different paradigmatic background (C) determines EMP correctly via the two 
different channels of impact (a and b). All three model predictions can provide 
the empirically measured value for EMP only if certain ad hoc parameter 
specifications are used. According to Occam’s razor, within the one paradigm, 
the superior model would be the simplest, i.e. the one that estimates EMP on only 
two channels of impact (c and d), ignoring two other channels (e and f) and thus 
over-simplifying the real world, since important information about the 
determination of EMP could be lost. With respect to the interparadigmatic choice, 
Occam’s razor would be indifferent and could not discriminate between models 
A and C.22 
                                                          
20 Of course, we have no information about standard economists’ awareness of 
alternative paradigms. All we know – taking their citation behaviour as an indicator – is 
that they do not care about alternative paradigms, not even in a critical way; see e.g. 
Kapeller 2010a, Kapeller 2010b. 
21 See e.g. Harman (2019) and the dispute about the progressiveness of the Keynesian 
SRP between Hands (1985 and 1990) and Blaug (1987) and Ahonen (1989). In 
Brzezinski/Dzielinski (2009) it becomes clear that the concepts of progressiveness and 
degenerativeness of SRP are not only difficult to pin down analytically but also to 
evaluate empirically. 
22 If we take EMP to be an abbreviation of ‘employment level’ and if a stands for 
‘aggregate demand’, b for ‘aggregate supply‘, c for ‘real wage’, d for ‘market structure’, 
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This is where the models’ or theories’ approximation to reality assumptions 
enters the picture. For quite some time, validity was assumed for Milton 
Friedman’s verdict that although model assumptions are judged to be unrealistic, 
the model may still be considered valid as long as its predictions are not 
empirically falsified (Friedman 1953) – what is known as the ‘F-twist’. To put it 
differently, Friedman favoured an assessment of theories against their 
predictions, not their assumptions. A long discussion about the ‘F-twist’ may be 
summarised by the statement that the realisticness of assumptions matters for the 
evaluation of theories and even that Friedman never argued otherwise (see e.g. 
Musgrave 1981; Mäki 2009). If anything, Friedman’s verdict may be taken 
implying a hierarchical ordering of outputs and inputs: first and foremost, 
models, theories and paradigms should be valued by their explanatory power 
(output) and the realisticness of their assumptions (inputs) is of only secondary 
importance. However, if a final assessment about the relative or comparative 
virtue of a model, theory or paradigm cannot be based on verisimilitude alone 
(or, as outlined above, if the correspondence with reality can only be achieved by 
making particular assumptions (e.g. about parametric settings)), the 
approximation to reality of the assumptions of the model, theory or paradigm 
will become an important measure of discrimination. Alas, the realisticness of 
assumptions is often not easy to evaluate: are the ‘closed system assumption’ or 
the assumption of transitivity of preferences or the ’gross substitutability 
assumption’ realistic or not? Quite often, such assumptions beyond empirical 
control are termed ‘axioms’ and compensate for the core assumptions (i.e. the 
deductive foundation which cannot be questioned) while testable assumptions 
form the protective belt. And it is this protective belt which needs to comprise 
unrealistic assumptions because the complexity and complicatedness of reality 
can never be grasped in totality (otherwise it would merely be an image of reality 
losing all its explanatory power) – the ’Abstractionist Defense’ (see e.g. 
Rappaport 1996). But will it be possible to assess the degree of realisticness of 
assumptions of a model, theory or paradigm relative to alternative models, 
theories or paradigms? Probably, with respect to empirically quantifiable 
parameters in models, but much less so with respect to unquantifiable 
assumptions in theories or axioms in paradigms.  
6. Conclusion 
The economic discipline finds itself in a somewhat precarious state: its self-image 
is that of a ’hard science’ producing objective knowledge based on a single 
paradigm including a variety of different theories and a common methodological 
standard which has finally evolved after a long history of competing ideas and 
some Methodenstreite in the wake of the discipline’s professionalisation. A 
                                                          
e for ‘hiring incentives’ and f for ‘search incentives’, model A would be the standard 
neoclassical labour market model with imperfections, model B the standard neoclassical 
labour market model with frictions and model C the simple post-Keynesian Z-D model.  
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pluralisation of economics as demanded by a small but growing number of 
scientists, students and practitioners would be seen as an undesirable backwards 
step in the maturation of the discipline, opening up economics to relativism and 
obscurantism. On the other hand, methodological restrictions in a non-
experimental science simply make the unambiguous selection of a single, 
monistic – ’true’ – theory or paradigm impossible and, thus, imperatively 
demand the ‘grandfathering’ of not only a variety of competing theories (within 
a given paradigm) but also a true pluralism of competing theories and paradigms 
as long as certain standards are met. How can both positions be reconciled? We 
can surely not have a monist economic science without the comprehensible 
accusation of ideological bias and restrictions on academic freedom but nor can 
we have, on the other hand, a pluralist economic science without the 
comprehensible accusation of relativism or non-science. Therefore, neither 
monism nor ‘radical pluralism’ (see Heise 2018: 123) appear to be acceptable and 
desirable, but a form of ‘regulated or structured pluralism’ based on a quality 
assurance procedure comprising the acceptance of a common methodological 
foundation and the development of an institutionalised system comparing 
economic theories as an acknowledged branch of scientific inquiry within the 
field of economics.  
Although comparison of economic theories will also be unable – like empirical 
testing – to unambigiously discriminate between economic theories and 
paradigms with respect to their verisimilitude, it will shed some light on the state 
of a paradigm, its complicatedness and the realisticness of its assumptions and, 
indispensibly, allows an informed choice of theories which cannot be avoided. 
Additionally and beyond the function of selection criteria, systematic 
comparison of economic theories may also provide information about inter alia:  
a) the axiomatic core and differences within it, thus, its paradigmatic affiliations; 
b) the relationship of different hypothesis (explanations) to different core axioms 
(pre-analytic visions) and their normativity; c) its paradigmatic foundations 
(heterodox or orthodox); d) their relatedness (commensurate or incommensurate; 
and e) their novelty. All this information is necessary to improve the quality and 
accurateness of scientific economic inquiry: the paradigmatic pluralists need to 
accept that plurality must concede quality control to avoid obscuratism, while 
the paradigmatic monists need to accept that an unavoidable variety and 
plurality of theories and paradigms requires procedures for a traceable choice. 
After its empirical turn, the economic discipline is in need of a ‘pluralistic and 
comparativist turn’. 
Although this is not the place to speculate about the viability of such a path of 
development, we need to return to the fact that a similar project of initiating an 
institutionalised comparison of theories failed in sociology. The main concern of 
those sociologists that promoted a comparison of sociological theories as an 
acknowledged branch of scientific inquiry was to find a common basis on which 
something like ’normal  science’ in a Kuhnian sense could be established – 
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something considered by many other sociologists to undermine the very nature 
of their discipline and rejected on the grounds of an ‘impossibility of objective 
comparison’ (see Klinkmann 1981, Stäheli 2000: 18).  For Greshoff/ 
Lindemann/Schimank (2007: 7), the failure to establish a consensus about the 
methodological requirements and possibilities of systematic comparisons was 
responsible for the collapse of the ‘comparativist turn’ resulting in the 
continuation of the status quo of a ‘pseudo pluralism’ in which “the particular 
positions and their relations were unresolved in such a way that they could not 
serve ‘as a critical authority’ for each other and could not question each other in 
order to advance knowledge” (Greshoff/Lindemann/ Schimank 2007: 5; my 
translation).  
There is reason to believe that status quo forces in economics (all those proponents 
of paradigms and theories that see their material basis and reputational position 
undermined) will also try to prevent a ‘comparativist turn’ – the likelihood of 
their success will depend on how much the economic discipline will be able to 
keep its methodological self-reflection at a low level.23 Or, as Dany Rodrik (2018: 
280) writes: “One wishes that economics training would do a better job of 
instructing future professional economists about their responsibilities – the need 
for multiple models, sound political economy analysis, and the ethics of public 
participation (…)”. Uskali Mäki’s (2018: 234) response to Rodrik can be taken as 
slightly sceptical in outlook: “I wonder if it would be too generous to require no 
more than envisioning a feasible strategy of re-designing the institutions of 
economics, perhaps re-educating the economic profession, imposing an ethical 
code of conduct, and the like – […]”. However, the fact that an acclaimed 
standard economist such as Dany Rodrik has deliberately engaged in 
methodological discussions can be taken as a sign of hope that comparing 
economic theories will become a recognised branch of inquiry and the occupation 
with different theories and paradigms will become the norm for a discipline that 
is aware of its many theoretical foundations.    
   
                                                          
23 “One day an exasperated theorist turned to me and explained: ‘Look, it is all about the 
division of labor. We do economics as it is currently practiced. If someday a philosopher 
of economics or a specialist in economic methodology comes up with a better idea, then 
somebody will tell us about it and we will know.’ Economists’ lack of curiosity on the 
philosophy of science is reflected in the fact that informed discussion on these questions 
is relegated to specialized journals (…). More damagingly, it is reflected in the lack of 
training in graduate school in methodology” (Rodrik 2018: 276). 
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